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ABSTRACT
In this study, the relationship between the labour unions and 
tlie state in Turkey during 1946-1980 era is analysed with the help of the 
application of the corporatist model. By identiiymg the dominant model tliat 
emerged in this relationship as mainly a variant of state corporatism, it is 
proposed that radicahsation and instabilty of the pre-1980 era, especially of 
the 1970s, was related to state attempts to install corporatist structures, rather 
than excessive demands of the labour unions.
The inquiry begins with the summary of the theoretical concepts 
central to this study. In the first chapter, the major varieties of state and 
liberal corporatism that have been identified in the most important studies on 
coiporatism is outlined and the conditions that have proposed to explain the 
rise and demise of different kinds of corporatist systems are summarised, hi 
the following chapters, concepts presented by the corporatist theory are tried 
to be applied to Turkey wliile the development of Turkish miionism is 
examined historically.
Bu çalışmada, Türkiye’de 1946-1980 dönemi boyunca işçi 
sendikalan ve devlet arasmdaki ilişki korporatist modelin yardumyla 
İncelenmektedir. Bu ilişkide ortaya çıkan hakim model devlet 
korporatizminin bir çeşidi olarak teşhis edilerek, 1980 öncesi dönemin, 
özellikle 1970'lerin istikrarsızlığı ve radikalleşmesinin işçi sendikalarmm aşuı 
taleplerinden ziyade, devletin korporatist yapılar yerleştirme çabalarma bağlı 
olduğu ileri sürühnektedir.
Araştırma, bu çahşmanm merkezini teşkil eden teorik 
kavramlarm özetiyle başlamaktadu·. Birinci bölümde, korporatizm hakkmda 
yapılan en önemli çalışmalarda belirlenen devlet ve hberal korporatizmin 
başlıca çeşitleri ortaya konmakta ve farklı korporatist sistem türlerinin 
yükseliş ve çöküşünü açıklamak için ileri sürülen koşullar özetlemnektedir. 
Müteakip bölümlerde ise, Türk sendikacıhğmm gelişimi tarilısel olarak 
incelenirken korporatist teorinin sundüğu kavramlar Türkiye'ye uygulanmaya 
çalışılmaktadır.
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Chapter One 
liNTRODUCTION
Why write a thesis on state-labour union relationship? The first 
reason is that many political institutions have been analysed but unions 
remain relatively understudied in Turkey. The second reason is that dunng 
the last decade, unions have enjoyed a very bad reputation and they were 
blamed for virtually every economic and political ill, and these kinds of 
attitudes are still continuing today to a certain extent. It is important to note 
that authoritai’ian solutions to the labour question after the 1980 coup were 
introduced in the name of coirecting the extremes of past decades. Unions 
are not perfect, but they are certainly not the source of all evil, they are the 
products of the society in which they are situated, and this paper tries 
to place them in their right context.
As one of the major interest gi'oups in any society, trade unions 
expand much of their energ>' to dealing with the state as the important 
actor in industrial relations. The reason for this is simple : the state is the 
source of legislation and is regarded as responsible for economic prosperity. 
Furthennore, the state is a significant employer in Turkey and its employees 
have joined unions in large numbers. Therefore, the fomi and substance of 
collective bargainings inevitably places the unions in a direct relationship 
with the state in Turkey.
Trade unions are basically industrial organisations and are 
reluctant to use industrial action for political puiposes. The histor>' of 
trade union politics in many systems shows that any union movement doing 
so risks massive state retaliation. However, any industrial action inevitably 
does have political consequences. For example, disputes in major industries 
can compel government intervention and changes in government policy, and 
strikes in the public sector challenge government policy directly. Thus, 
generally, governments perceive the power of trade unions as disruptive and 
try to establish a smooth relationship with them in order to avoid such 
disruption. On the other hand, unions seek co-operation with state in order 
to acquire organisational and material concessions while the state pi'omotes 
co-operation out of a belief in the dismptive power of the unions.
It is the main thesis of this paper that the characteristic feature 
of this relationship was, a gi'eater or lesser degi'ee, of state coiporatisni in 
Turkey in the 1946 -1980 era. Regarding the universe of interest groups in 
general, it would be right to argue that Turkey had a heterogeneous, hybrid 
system of representation in which pluralist and coiporatist structures have 
coexisted and competed for predominance and periodic shifts have 
occLiued between pluralist and coiporatist policies since the establislmient 
of the Turkish Republic'. It can be claimed, however, in the domain of 
labour-state relations coiporatist arrangements predominated and persisted 
in the 1946-80 era. Concerning the t>pes of coiporatism operative in the era, 
it is thesis of this paper that the model emerged in the organisation of labour 
in Turkey remained as mainly a variant of state coiporatism even though it 
involved some elements of neo-corporatism in the 1960-80 period. In other 
words, although the process involved neo-coiporatist mechanisms of trade­
offs in terms of the state providing both constraints and inducements, 
because the labour sector was still structured from above, dependent upon 
and penetrated by the state, it is possible to characterise the structure of 
the model as an example of state corporatism having some inclusionary' 
elements.
In this study, the single-party regime of Turkey is not examined 
in detail, because it was assumed that until 1946, the model applied by the 
state had no relation with any variants of corporatism, but it was monism 
detemiined by paternalistic state approach.- Similarly, since the policy of the 
government has been to de-unionise rather than to corporatise the organised 
labour, the post-1980 era is excluded too.·^
I. CORPORATISM AND PLL!IC\L1SM AS ALTERNATIV E 
MODELS OF INTEREST REPRESENTATION
Different authors have denned corporatism differently. There is 
a plurality of conceptual approaches, because the traditional concept 
of corporatism has been taken up in the decades after the Second World 
War by many authors independently of each other. In the corporatist 
literature, Schmitter's typological distinction between " corporatism " and 
" pluralism " seems to be the best conceptualization which could sewe as the 
basis for building a model of interest representation.^ Therefore, in 
understanding coiporatism and pluralism as alternative models for
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structuring systems of interest representation , Schmitter’s definition of 
these concepts will be used. He states : " Coiporatism can be defined as 
a system of representation in which the constituent units are organised into 
a limited number of singular compulsoiy, non-competitive, hierai'chically 
ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed 
( if not created ) by the state and granted a deliberate representational 
monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing 
certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and 
supports.
As an alternative model ; " Pluralism can be defined as a system 
of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into 
an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchically 
ordered and self-detennined ( as to type or scope of interest ) categories 
which are not specifically licensed, recogiised, subsidised, created or 
otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the 
state and which do not exercise monopoly of representational activity 
within their respective categories.
Schmitter's defimtion of coiporatism combines two dimensions; 
recogiition and control by the government on the one hand, and the 
structure of the system of interest representation on the other.’ However, 
the focus is on the latter, since the distinction between " coiporatism " 
and " pluralism " is essentially based on the characteristics of the 
individual organisation in temis of whether or not they are compulsorily or 
hierarchically ordered, and on the system of organisations as to whether or
not it is defined as a representational monopoly or a singular and non­
competitive SN’Stem.
However, another approach to corporatism concentrates on 
changes in industrial relations in temis of growing government inter\'ention 
in wage fonnation and related matters. For example, Colin Crouch places 
" corporatism " not only in opposition to " market liberalism ", but also to 
" liberal collectivism " which is characterised by the " industrial relations 
compromise " based on free " collective bargaining
Lehmbruch stresses Schmitter's first dimension - recognition 
and control by the government - together with industrial relations. He defines 
a fully " corporatized " polity by the following characteristics : ^
l.a) Interest organisations are strongly coopted into 
governmental decision-making ( as measured by their inclusion in 
advisoiy committees, procedures of consultation and other appropriate 
indicators)
b) Large interest organisations ( in particular, labour unions ) 
are strongly linked to political parties and take part in policy 
fonnulations in a sort of functional division of labour.
2. a) Most interest organisations are hierarchically structured and 
membership tends to be compulsoP)'.
b) Occupational categories are represented by non-competitive 
organisations enjoying a monopoly of representation.
3. Industrial relations are characterised by strong "concertation" 
of labour unions and employers' organizations with goveniinent. It implies 
that labour unions refrain from strongly employing the strike weapon 
or highly conflictual tactics.
As it is mentioned above, the defining principles of corporatism 
diverge from the basic pluralist assumption of " interest gi'oup autonomy " 
and "multiplicity and quality in the competitive strength of 
interest groups" Instead, the concept of corporatism emphasises 
non-competitiveness, bureaucratisation and state control over them.^o 
Then the question is why corporatism emerges. Schmitter suggests 
that the corporatization of interest representation is related to certain 
structural imperatives of capitalist development. He also argues that 
historically the emergence of different varieties of corporatism are related 
to " differences in the specific nature of these imperatives or needs at 
different stages of the institutional development and international context 
of capitalism ".’· Accordingly, Schmitter distinguishes between two 
corporatist sub-types : societal corporatism and state corporatism.'2 He 
suggests that state corporatism has been characterised by associations that 
are created from above, depended upon and penetrated by the state, 
whereas societal corporatism has included associations that emerge 
spontaneously, retain considerable autonomy and themselves penetrate 
the state.'3
" When viewed statically, these two subtypes exhibit a basic 
structural similarity. However, when viewed in motion, they appear as 
products of very different political, social and economic processes and
serve as vehicles for different power relations. Societal coiporatism is 
found embedded in political systems with relatively autonomous, 
multilayered tenitorial units, open, competitive electoral processes and 
party systems. It appears to be the concomitant, if not the component, of 
the post-liberal, advanced capitalist, organised democratic welfare state. 
On the other hand, state corporatism tends to be associated with political 
systems in which territorial subunits are tightly subordinated to central 
bureaucratic power, elections are non-existent or plebiscitary, party 
systems are dominated or monopolised by a single party, authorities are 
ideologically exclusive and political subcultures based on class, ethnicity, 
language or regionalism ai'e repressed. Tlierefore, state corporatism seems 
to be the defining element of the anti liberal, delayed capitalist, 
authoritarian, neo-mercantilist state.
Schmitter states that the demise of incipient pluralism and its 
replacement by state corporatism seems closely associated with the 
necessity to enforce " social peace ", not by coopting and incorporating, 
but by repressing and excluding the autonomous articulation of 
subordinate class demands. It takes place in a situation where the 
bourgeoisie is too weak, internally divided, externally dependent and./or 
short of resources to respond effectively and legitimately to these 
demands within the fi'amework of the liberal democratic state. On the 
other hand, " the decay of pluralism and its gnadual displacement by 
societal coiporatism can be related primarily to the necessity for a stable, 
bourgeois dominant regime, due to the process of concentration of 
ownership, competition between national economies, expansion of the 
role of public policy and rationalisation of decision making within the
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state to incoiporate subordinate classes or gixuips more closely within 
the political process."'·" In short, the core of Schmitter's speculation about 
structural conduciveness rests on the problems generated by the delayed, 
dependent capitalist development and non-hegemonic class relationship in 
the case of state corporatism, and advanced, monopoly or cenfralised 
capitalist development and collaborative class relations in the case of 
societal corjDoratism.
Wliat Schmitter contributes here is the outline of a model for 
analysing periodic fluctuations between pluralist and corporatist 
associational policies with reference to underlying economic change.’^  
Bianchi suggests a more explicit statement of Schmitter's model involving 
four distinct phases incipient pluralism, state corporatism, advanced 
pluralism and societal corporatism, and he tries to apply this scheme to 
Turkev.
In the remaining part of this chapter, the major varieties of state 
and societal coiporatism that have been identified in the most important 
studies on corporatism will be outlined and the conditions that have been 
proposed to explain the rise and demise of different kinds of coiporatist 
systems will be summarised. It is hoped that this will help to charactense 
the nature of Turkish coiporatism in the following chapters.
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II. VARIETIES OF STATE CORPORATISM
In an attempt to understand and analyse the new fomi of 
authoritarianism in Latin America, Guillenno O'Donnell tries to explain 
the diversity of varieties of state corporatism in tenns of the changing 
imperatives of dependent capitalist development.''' Like Schmitter, he 
places greater emphasis on economic conditions than political ones in 
explaining the emergence of different varieties of corporatism. He 
identifies rivo varieties of state corporatism. He regards them as different 
kinds of elite responses to political and economical crises caused by 
different stages of dependent capitalist development. He distinguishes 
between the " incoiporating corporatism " of the authoritarian-populist 
periods and " exclusionaiy coiporatism " of new type of state, the 
"bureaucratic-authoritarian".'*' Wliile he associates the first variety of state 
corporatism with the early phase of import substitution, he associates the 
second variety with more recent efforts to restructure domestic industry·' 
and strengthen its ties with intemational capitalism.
O'Donnell explains the emergence of bureaucratic-authoritarian 
regimes as a reaction of dominant social groups to a series of economic 
and political crises. He regards these crises as a legacy of earlier populist 
authoritarian efforts to win lower-class support by granting new political 
and economic concessions. He states that Import Substitution 
Industrialisation (ISl) policies of populist governments necessitated the 
expansion of the domestic market and real increases in the purchasing 
power of workers. Hence, workers received important material benefits
and support for unionisation as an organisation in exchange for their 
political support against the previously dominant export elites.’^
However, populism was also coiporatist: It pennitted the 
political activation and social incorporation of lower class groups while 
carefully controlling their demands by the imposition of vertical 
relationship subordinating the unions to the state.-” In the later stages, 
however, populism entailed a crucial increase in the political and 
economic weight of the popular sector. Tlie urban popular sector was 
given its first chances to have some effective say in national politics, and 
its leaders were able to participate in bargaining within the populist 
coalition.21 Above all, the recognition of the unions' right to represent the 
working class before the bourgeoisie, the codification of the right to 
strike, and important improvements in the statutes regulating security of 
employement all emerged together with corporatisation. These 
concessions encouraged industrialisation in its early stages but later 
created an obstacle to transition to a more advanced stage. Hence, in 
O’Doimell's view, the more co-optative and incorporating policies of the 
earlier corporatist regimes, the more repressive and excluding policies of 
recent corporatist regimes were.
In the later stages of ISI, the domestic market for simple 
manufactured products was satisfied and opportunities for industrial 
expansion became more limited. Rising inflation and balance of payments 
deficits as well as foreign indebtedness led to a zero-sum economic 
situation. This was the end of the horizontal-extensive industrial growth 
based on ISI. As the initial pace of industrialisation and growth of the
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market lessened and gave way to the crises already mentioned, the 
populist state began to cmmble, opening way for mass praetorianism." 
The weakened state could do little to contain the growing activation of 
the popular sector. The negative or zero groMh undennined the economic 
gains made by the urban middle and working classes and hence eroded 
the viability of the populist coalitions on which these regimes were based.
Further development required the ' deepening ' of industrialisation 
through tlte domestic manufacture of intermediate and capital goods. 
However, this could not be achieved without the collaboration of 
international capital. This necessitated the creation of an environment 
favourable to the activities of transnational coiporations. The 
uncertainities and appearent risks associated with praetorianism had made 
international investors wary, and their confidence had to be regained in 
order to attract capital for an advance towards deepening.-·^
This problem had inevitably political implications. In order to 
solve the economic problem, effective collaboration between the 
entrepreneurial state and its international partners was necessaiy, which in 
turn, required a high degree of " future certainty " of social peace and 
political stability, instead of " acute uncertainty " created by mass 
praetorianism .A s a result, branches of multinational corporations and 
various sectors of the national bourgeoisie together with the anned forces 
agreed on the necessity of ending the crisis before it became 
uncontrollable. The growing political activation of the popular sector 
encouraged the view that " excessive " and " premature " demands for 
political and economic participation were the principle cause of
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iincertainities. According to O'Donnell, all of these events mentioned 
above caused a defensive reaction, that is the implantation of the " 
bureaucratic-authoritarian " state which is based on exclusion of the 
popular sector.2? 'pj-je result is the emergence of a new kind of corporatist 
state with expanded coercive capabilities and entrepreneurial functions 
which has tried to restructure civil society and made it more predictable in 
order to attract new inflow of foreign investments.
Similar views to that of O'Donnell have been expressed by 
Alfred Stepan. He distinguishes " two policy poles " within state 
corporatism.-6 An " inclusionary pole " for policies aimed at integrating 
lower-class groups within a new economic and political order, and an 
"exclusionary pole" for policies that rely heavily on coercive measures to 
deactivate and then restructure lower-class groups.
Although he makes a distinction between these poles, he 
recognises that any attempt to install a regime using corporatist 
mechanisms often does combine inclusionary and exclusionary policies. 
Therefore, the label " inclusionary " or " exclusionary " when attached to 
corporatist systems refers to the dominant policy orientation of the state 
elite.
As it is obvious fi-om the temiinology he has used, there is 
much in common between his approach and O'Donnell's. Like O'Donnell, 
Stepan regards " inclusionary " and "exclusionary" corporatism as 
distinct types of authoritarian responses to crises that have arisen at 
different stages of economic development. He thinks that inclusionary
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corporatism is more likely in the earlier stages of import-substitution 
industrialization, where modem elites and urban working classes perceive 
significant room for populist multiclass coalitions.-^ On the other hand, in 
his view, exclusionary corporatism is more likely to be attempted " if, 
after the import-substitution phase, the pattern of industrial development 
begins to stagnate, the political and economic struggle intensifies, and 
politics is increasingly perceived in zero-sum tenns
In spite of the similarities between their approaches, when 
compared to O'Donnell, Stepan places much greater emphasis on the 
political conditions rather than on the common economic problems that 
have promoted state corporatism. O'Donnell tends to restrict, and to link 
casually, the emergence of " excluding " systems to the economic 
requirements of highly modernised, dependent capitalist systems. Wlnle 
Stepan, too, accepts this as frequently important, his use of 
" exclusionary " also covers " elite exclusive motivations that are largely 
political " and " a context not as explicitly tied to the crisis of import- 
substitution in highly modernised dependent economies ".-^ o Stepan is 
primarily interested in explaining why authoritarian elites in different 
countries employed such different levels of coercion when attempting to 
install state corporatist regimes. He argues that the variety of corporatist 
installation attempts must be examined in tenns of the responses of the 
already organised segments of civil society that constituted either potential 
sources of resistance or potential bases of support.
After distingniishing between inclusionary and exclusionary/ 
varieties of state corporatism, Stepan specifies conditions that are
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"facilitating" or "inhibiting" the successful installation of such regimes.· '^ 
The two variables that he regards as indispensable conditions for both 
types of state corporatism are the state elite's organizational strength and 
ideological unity and its coercive, economic, and symbolic resource 
capacity in relation to the effective demands made on the state by civil 
society.^" Concerning the characteristics of civil society, he suggests three 
other variables which detenniiie the relative suitability of inclusionaiy and 
exclusionary strategies. The third variable that he points out is the degree 
of development of autonomous parties and interest groups.”  He assumes 
that the relative autonomy, strength, and number of organisations already 
structured along non-corporatist lines in civil society affects the potential 
resistance and opposition to both inclusionary and exclusionary 
installation attempts. The fourth variable is the degree of societal 
polarisation.”  He regards a high degree of political and ideological 
polarisation as a favourable condition to exclusionar,' strategies, because 
it is seen as creating a justification for repression. However, he considers 
the same condition as a unfavourable to inclusionai^ strategies, because it 
is seen as undennining the elite's ability to coopt already committed 
sectors. The final variable that he considers as central to inclusionary 
corporatism but less critical for exclusionaiy corporatism is the degree to 
which social welfare and other social refonn programs have been 
elaborated prior to the installation attempts. ·^"' He regards the low degree 
of prior social welfare legislation as favourable to inclusionary strategies, 
because it gives the elite a substantial " refonn space " for incorporating 
lower class groups by initiating redistributive measures and benefits on 
the acceptance of new state controlled associations.
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David and Ruth Collier have proposed an alternative framework 
for distinguishing varieties of state corporatism on the basis of an 
analysis of the relationship between the state and organised labour in 
Latin Anierica.^ 6 They identify wide range of coiporatist techniques that 
have been used for controlling the labour movements. They think that the 
relationship between the state and interest associations, to a substantial 
degree, fonnalised in the legal system. Therefore, according to them, 
examination of the fonnal legislation that regulates state-group relations is 
a useful point of departure in order to distinguish different varieties of 
co rpora tism .T hey  restrict the focus of their analyses to the 
relationship between the state and organised labour , because they 
consider state-labour relations as a paiticularly crucial aspect of 
corporatism. They classify corporatist labour laws in tenns of 
"inducements" to win the co-operation and/or political support of the 
labour leaders and "constraints" to impose direct control over labour 
organisations and labour le a d e rs .In  this context, they view corporatism 
as involving an interplay betw'een inducements and constraints. Like 
Stepan, they seek to explain the historical diversity of state corporatism 
not in tenns of the changing imperatives of the dependent capitalist 
development, but in tenns of the " give-and-take of politics ". They 
observe a relationship between the larger political context and different 
patterns of inducements and constraints.’^  They argue that the relative 
importance of inducements and constraints in particular corporatist 
arrangement has been detennined by two important features of the 
political context the extent to which the authoritarian rulers have 
depended on the political support of organised labour and the previous 
strength and autonomy of the labour movement itself^«
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Though they distinguish between inducements and constraints, 
the Colliers state that both of them ser\^e as mechanisms to influence the 
behaviour of labour movement^' Wliile constraints are seen as producing 
compliance by the application, or threat of application of negative 
sanctions, by contrast, inducements involve the application of advantages. 
Yet, they also view inducements as mechanisms of co-optation that lead 
to social control. These inducements may, like constraints, finally lead to 
state penetration and domination of labour organisations for at least tliree 
reasons.^' First, an inducement such as monopoly of representation is by 
its nature offered to some labour organisations and witheld from others. 
This provision is used to undemiine radical unions and promote those 
favoured by the government. Second, unions receiving inducements must 
commonly meet various fonnal requirements in order receive them. 
Finally, " the grant of official recognition, monopoly of representation, 
compulsoiy membership, or subsidy by the state may make the leadership 
dependent on the state, rather than on union members, for the union's 
legitimacy and viability. This dependency accelerates the tendency for 
labour leadership to become an oligarchy less responsive to the needs of 
the workers than to the concerns of state agencies or the political elite 
with w'hich the leaders interact.’''’-''
The Colliers operationalise inducements and constraints by 
analysing in greater detail specific corporative provisions that generally 
characterised state-labour relations in Latin A m erica .U nder the heading 
of inducements, they include provisions regarding registration, monopoly 
of representation, compulsory membership, and subsidy ; and under the
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heading of constraints included provisions regulating collective 
bargaining and strikes, controls in deinand-inaking, control of leadership 
and provisions for state monitoring and intervention in interaal union 
affairs.
On the basis of an analysis of labour law provisions as an 
indicators of the relationship bebveen the state and organised labour in 
Latin America, the Colliers identify four different varieties of state 
corporatism which they place along a continuum of "constraints oriented" 
and "inducements oriented" aiTangements.^-^ The Colliers distinguish 
between systems of " pure constraints " and systems of " pre-emptive 
co-optation " on the constraints side of the continuum. In the pure 
constraints type of the system, govemments are extremely antilabour and 
they avoid seeking even passive support of organised labour. Instead, by 
repressive attempts they try to deactivate already strong and politically 
mobilised labour movements. This variety of state corporatism tends to 
appear in a context in which the primary concern of the government is 
with control. Rather than relying on co-optation, this control is based 
primarily on direct constraints on unions and is backed by considerable 
force and repression. In the pre-emptive co-optation ty'pe of the system 
which is the second variety of state corporatism on the constraints- 
oriented side of the continuum, elites exercise influence over the 
development of nascent labour movements in order to preempt the 
emergence of autonomous unions that are not dependent on the state. By 
gradually increasing both inducements and constraints they encourage the 
co-operation of the weak union leaders. This allows the state to retain
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effective control growing labour movements without widespread and 
sustained coercion.
On the more inducements side of the continuum, the Colliers 
distinguish between two types of " populist " arraiigements in which the 
government seeks to gain or retain the political support of labour and in 
which unions are relatively powerful and/or autonomous.^ In the first 
type, labour is an essential support group, but it is still weak and 
disorganised. Thus, the government is able to use inducements to create 
labour movements from above. In the second type, populist elites are 
confronted with previously existing and already powerful labour 
movements. In this case, labour has a greater capacity to resist the 
imposition of constraints and/or the state has a greater need to extend 
inducements in order to gain the support and cooperation of labour.They 
provide critical assistance in installing new regimes and have a strong 
capacity to resist imposition of greater constraints. The Colliers 
characterise government-labour relations in these systems as "most 
inducement oriented" corporatist arrangements. In both cases the 
outcome is the elite's clear dependence on the political support of 
relatively strong working - class organisation. The Colliers’ findings 
clearly indicate that a higher level of both inducements and constraints 
tend to be associated with the state corporatist systems lying at both 
extremes of the inducements-constrains continuum (with the pure 
constraints or most inducement oriented systems).
Finally, the Colliers conclude that it is useful to treat the 
distinction between state and societal corporatism not as a dichotomy but
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as a continuum, with some cases located at least part way along this 
continuum towards societal corporatism^’ During certain periods, adopted 
corporatist policies toward strong labour movements can be so heavily 
inducement oriented that they appear to be " intemiediate cases " 
between state and societal corporatism. The Colliers argue that we should 
not conceive societal corporatism as a " phenomenon that is either 
present or absen t", but rather as a " series of traits that may be present or 
absent to vaiy'ing degrees
III. VARIETIES OF SOCIETAL CORPOIL4TISM
Wlnle many scholars have given attention to support seeking, 
inclusionary and inducements oriented varieties of state corporatism, 
many others discussed the role of state initiative, coercion and societal 
control in societal corporatist systems. For example, according to Leo 
Panitch, " although the varieties of corporatist theoiy are many, the 
common premise is that class hannony and organic unity are essential to 
society and could be secured if the various functional groups, and 
especially the organisations of capital and labour, have the right of 
representation in national decision making, and a high degree of 
flmctional autonomy under the aegis of the state as the supreme collective 
community, but they would also have the duty of maintaining the 
functional hierarchy and social discipline consistent with the needs of the 
nation-state as a whole. In short, he states that the main underlying
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assunij)tions o f existing theories on corporatism are social harmony, state 
neutrality vis-a-vis the groups and powder equivalence between them.
However, these assumptions lead to ignore the factors o f class
conflict, status antogonism and center-periphei^ tension that corporatism 
is designed to suppress.Corporatism's relation to capitalism and specific
class interests, as well as the role o f state coercion in the implementation 
of corporatism seems as an instrument for rescuing and consolidating
capitalism rather than replacing it.·^ ' In his opinion, the importance of
liberal democracy for corporatism in a capitalist society is that " the 
guarantee of legal and political equality for functional groups makes the " 
social contract " appear as an exchange between equals, despite vast 
inequalities beUveen the groups in power and distributional tenns.”-"-
Therefore, according to him, corporatist intermediation structures are not
more than a decorative facade for force and dom ination.Panitch's views 
lead him to deny that the major distinction between state and societal 
corporatism is that the fonner is coercively imposed from above, whereas 
the latter is voluntary emerged out of group consensus. Instead, he argues 
that state initiative and coercion are indispensable in establishing and 
maintaining all corporatist systems. He states that authoritarian and liberal 
varieties differ merely in the degree to which tlie use of coercion is 
diffuse, sustained and direct, or specific, sporadic and indirect. He insists
on that state coercion, at least in the fonn of repressing rank and file 
actions and insulting union leadership from its effects is a " sine qua non " 
of establishing stable corporatist structures and this raises in turn the 
fundamental question of the contradiction between the corporatism and 
political freedom.■‘'4
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As it is evident from above, he rejects the assumption of state 
neutrality. Rather, he employs a theory of state which sees the state as 
relatively autonomous. He thinks that, as Miliband pointed out with 
regard to Marx’s famous fonuulation that ' the executive of the modem 
state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole 
bourgeoisie ' ; " the notion of common affairs assume the existence of 
particular ones and the notion of the whole bourgeoisie implies the 
existence of seperate elements which make up that w h o l e . I n  his view, 
state should enjoy a certain degree of authority to maintain the long-tenn 
interests of the whole class and intervene against the short tenn interests 
of the factions of capitalist class. For Panitch, this explains the reason of 
some material, economic and social gains for the working class under 
corporatist structures. However, these gains are still in the boundries of 
capitalist structure.·" '^ Therefore, he points out that corporatist exchanges 
are asymmetric which create imbalances between groups participated in 
coiporatist arrangements.-'’
Panitch concludes that because corporatism within liberal 
democracies has become a powerful vehicle for reinforcing class 
dominance, it creates instability.·'« He argues that under the corporatist 
stmctures which have a bias against working class, trade union leaders 
become unable to promote the interests of their members, thus they 
eventually come under heavy pressure from their members to withdraw 
from the incomes policy structures and abstain from cooperative 
behaviour in broader in economic planning structu res.In  other words, he 
thinks that participation in corporatist arrangements delegitimises the 
union leadership in the eyes of their base. In his view, this rank-and -file
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dissent may culminate in the wage and illegal strike explosion to withdraw 
from corporatist structures which may in turn bring new state coercive 
measures/''^ He suggests that increasing levels of coercion will be 
necessary to sustain the social coiporatist systems. However, to meet the 
challange of a working-class united against the operation of laws, state 
coercion have to go far beyond the immediate field of industrial relations. 
To have made these laws operable, the extensive use of police powers 
would have been necessary, and probably would have involved limiting 
the rights of free speech and assembly. Hence, he states that this inlierent 
instability of corporatism may lead to the " abrogation of liberal 
democracy itself"^’ He warns that increasingly coercive efforts to 
preserve and extend corporatism are likely to encourage more overt 
authoritarian tendencies in the future. In short, he emphasises the 
similarities between societal and state corporatism and rejects the 
argument that voluntary participation is a distinguishing trait of societal 
corporatism.
Gerhai'd Lehmbruch observes a trend towards direct controls in 
economic policy to be supplemented or replaced by political bargaining of 
governments with large interest associations, that is to say, by corporatist 
consensus-building. However, he adds that it would be premature to 
speculate that coiporatist policy making signifies the displacement of 
parliamentary and party government by a new pattern of consensus- 
building .^ 2
Gerhard Lehmbruch thinks that so far, Schmitter has given the 
most elaborate definition of corporatism which distinguish it from other
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types of " interest intemiediation ", such as " pluralism " and 
"syndicalism"/'^ However, in his opinion, coiporatism is more than a 
peculiar pattern of articulation of interests. Rather, " it is an 
institutionalised pattern of policy fonnation in which large interest 
organisations cooperate with each other and with public authorities not 
only in the articulation of interests, but - in its developed forms - in the 
authoritative allocation of values and in the implementation of such 
policies. For him, the traditional concept of " interest representation " 
is quite inappropriate for a theoretical understanding of corporatism. He 
thinks that the mutual penetration of bureaucracies and large interest 
organisations should be taken into consideration. However, he also warns 
that consultation and cooperation of govenmient with organised interest 
groups should not be confused with liberal corporatism, because such 
consultations are common practises in all constitutional democracies with 
a highly developed capitalist economies. In his view, the distinguishing 
characteristic of liberal corporatism is a high degree of collaboration 
among these groups themselves in the shaping of economic policy.
He distinguishes two levels of bargaining in liberal corporatist 
systems ; First, bargaining among the " autonomous groups " ; second, 
bargaining between government and the " cartel " of organised groups. 
However, he states that these two levels may merge into " one-step " 
bargaining process in which the government engages in 
" multilateral " talks with a plurality of associations. Thus, the government 
may ser\e as an active " mediator " between them.
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According to Lehmbruch, liberal variety of coiporatism is 
related to problems of economic policy-making which arise in a rather 
advanced stage of capitalist development/'^’ Like Panitch, he puts an 
emphasis on corporatism in the relation of labour and capital. In his view, 
income policies appear to constitute a core domain of liberal 
co ipo ra tism .H e considers organised labour and business as the most 
important interest groups included in the corporatist pattern. He thinks 
that their collaboration in a corporatist scheme constitutes the central 
feature of liberal corporatism.^’^
Lehmbruch distinguishes more stable and effective varieties of 
corporatism from more ineffective and unstable ones. He identifies three 
major varieties of liberal corporatism. He thinks that Austria constitutes 
the clearest example of the most fully developed type of liberal 
corporatism which he refers as " Sozialpertnerschaft " (social 
partnership).^'^ In this system, voluntaty and autonomous collaboration of 
a few powerful peak association concerning economic policy tends to turn 
into a more fonnal and peiinanent one. For example, in the case of 
Austria, in 1957, the government established a fonnal institution. Joint 
Commission on Prices and Wages in which labour, business, agriculture 
and government are represented. Fonnal reunions of the Joint 
Commission are presided over by the Federal Chancellor, however, 
representatives of the government sit in advisory capacity only in order 
not to upset numerical parity between organised labour and business. 
There are also infonnal summit meetings between the presidents of the 
major peak organisations preceding the fonnal reunions in which many 
issues are negotiated. This most clearly marks the shift towards
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autonomous clearing between interest grups and the diminishing role of 
the govemment.
In a second categor)^ , Lehmbruch includes the less stable 
systems of " economic crisis management " in which concerted action is 
more dependent upon active state intervention and tend to break down 
during periods of economic recovery and prosperity. He gives the West 
Gemían case as an exmnple of this variety of societal coiporatism.^'^ As 
opposed to Austria, in ex-West Gemiany number of participants involved 
in bai'gaining process was rather higli since a large number of associations 
were invited to join Konzertierk Aktion (Concerted Action). Its another 
difference from the first category is the active leading role played by the 
govenunent. The Federal Minister of Economy presides over the meetings 
and has the main responsibility. In addition, there are officialls from many 
ministries. Since the power structure within the interest group system is 
much diffuse than in Austria, coordination becomes the business of the 
govemment in West Gemiany. However, this leads to lower degree of 
effectiveness of the Konzertierte Aktion. As indicated above, in this state- 
coordinated type of liberal corporatism effective collaboration only occurs 
under the pressure of threatening unemployement during the times of 
economic crisis, and system tends to break dowi in periods of economic 
recovery and continuing boom. Hence, in practise, it senses as an 
instrument of crisis management rather than of continuous economic 
guidence.
In a third category, Lehmbruch includes highly unstable systems 
of liberal corporatism in which strong state initiatives and overt threats of 
force are required to secure bilateral co-operation from the leaders of
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numerous decentralised and mutually antagonistic associations. He gives 
the examples of France and Great Britain representing this variety of 
liberal corporatism.’’ In such countries, a high degree of rank-and-file 
autonomy and strong " class conflict " orientation of the labour movement 
prevents the development of liberal corporatism.
Lehmbruch also specifies the conditions which led to tlie 
emergence of different varieties of liberal corporatism that are mentioned 
above. According to him, the factor that clearly distinguishes the 
varieties of liberal corporatism is the structural characteristics of the trade 
miion organisation.”  He argues that a high degree of centralisation and 
concentration, as in Austria, seems to be required for stable and effective 
liberal corporatist arrangements. However, it becomes less stable and 
effective if the union movement is centralised, but not concentrated, as in 
the case of West Gennany. Lack of both conditions and high degree of 
rank-and-file autonomy w'hen combined w'ith shop level bargainings as in 
Great Britain, tend to impair liberal corporatist arrangements.’·^
In addition to structural properties of union organisation, the 
position of the labour movement w'ithin the party system is another 
important independent variable detennining the greater or lesser 
willingness of organised labour to cooperate within a liberal coiporatist 
fi'amework.’  ^ " Generally speaking, liberal corporatism is more developed 
in those countries where the working class movement had obtained 
participation in political power by the channel of party system and wdiere, 
in consequence, the trade unions had gained privileged access to 
governmental and administrative centers of decision."’  ^ The commitment 
of union leaders to liberal corporatist arrangements is the greatest where
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the social democrats have been the leading party in government as in the 
case of Scandinavian countries or where the social democrat party is 
integrated into a elite cailel as in the case of Austria.
Complementing the structural and political ones, there is a key 
economic factor in influencing the willingness of union leaders to 
cooperate in liberal corporatist system. It is the extent of state’s direct 
involvement in industrial production and opportunities for organised 
labour to participate in the management of large public economic sector.
Wlien the views of Panitch and Lehmbruch are compared, they 
seem to agree that corporatist arrangements are created and sustained by 
state's willingness to use inducements and constraints which encourage 
group leaders to accept responsibility for shaping and implementing 
unpopular economic policies. However, while Lehmbruch views large 
measure of constitutional autonomy of the groups involved and the 
voluntary character of institutionalised cooperation of conflicting social 
groups as the distinguishing trait of liberal coiporatism,’  ^ Panitch objects 
this argument by stating that state initiative and coercion are sine qua non 
conditions of establishing and sustaining all corporatist arrangements 
including liberal variety of it.^ « Their explanations of the origins and 
development of societal corporatism also differ on a number of key issues. 
According to Panitch, the emergence of corporatist collaboration is 
dependent on " good times ", when the growth and prosperity may 
temporarily overshadow the deepening social contradictions. However, 
for Lehmbruch, corporatist arrangements often originate during " hard 
times ". He regards them as unconventional responses to crisis and
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gradually becoming accepted as routine techniques of conflict resolution. 
Panitcli thinks that the inherent fragility of corporatist bargaining process 
will result in more frequent breakdowns and likely to encourage 
authoritarian tendencies in the f u t u r e . O n  the other hand, Lehmbruch 
sees the possibility that corporatist bargaining may " spill over ’’ and 
cover previously excluded issues.
As the comparison of Panitch’s and Lehmbruch's views has 
revealed. Panitch's arguments represent the Marxist critique of neo­
corporatism. Although he stresses the relative autonomy of the state from 
the bourgeoisie, there are some fundamental similarities between Paiiitch's 
and ' reductionist ' Marxists' view which advocate that " coiporatism is a 
straightforwardly a fonn of class collaboration. The unions are duped into 
a false sense of social recognition and ' incorporated ' into the logic of 
capitalist economic restraint. Corporatism is thus a state strategy of 
operating directly on the behalf of the capitalist c l a s s . O n  the other 
hand, Lehmbruch’s understanding of neo-corporatism remains tied to 
pluralist paradigm. He insists on treating the relationships between 
interest groups as if they take place between equal partners and assumes 
that trade unions, employers and the state will counterbalance the each 
other. However, this pluralist notion does not confonri with the general 
acceptæice in the corporatist literature that " coiporatism is a means of 
stablising capitalist economic relations and it emerges as a result of the 
attempts of intei-ventionist welfare state to resolve the problems it faced 
with.^ ·^  In this sense, the emergence of neo-corporatism can be related to 
imperatives of the particular stage of capitalist development. In 1960s and 
1970s, " as the modem welfare state came serve as the indispensable
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guarator of capitalism by expanding its regulative tasks, it found that it 
needed professional experience and prior aggregation of opinion which 
only singular, hierarchically ordered, consensually led representative 
monopolies could provide."*'* Tlierefore, as the direct intervention in the 
economy required the direct cooperation of the trade unions, the concept 
of corporatism gained popularity in 1960s and 1970s.*-“* Neo-corporatism 
was the nationalist solution of the domestic economies to the crisis 
situation in international political economy.*^ Under the prevailing neo­
right mentality in 1980s, however, " it is obvious that capitalism had no 
' need ' to resort to corporatism as its main source of sui-vival: the logic of 
the market and the strong ann of the state would do equally w^ell."*’
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Chapter Two
FROM PATERNALISM TO INCLLSIONARY STATE 
CORPORATISM : 1946 - 1960 ERA UNDER EXAMINATION
I. LABOUR AND STATE IN THE TURKISH REPUBLIC UNTIL 1950
The emergence of working class as a force on Turkey's political 
scene is an event of the years since the Second World War. Tlie organized 
expression of this class, trade unions, also made their appearance in these 
years. Until the end of the World War II Turkish workers were totally 
unprotected, with neither a party nor unions to defend their interests.' 
Because of the nature of the authoritarian single-party goverament, labour 
had no say whatsoever in the public affairs of the country in the period under 
review.2 The republican rule, established after the end of the Independence 
War in 1923, recognised no rights to labour to organise or to strike. Although 
labour still had certain organisations of its owm, they were in the fonn of 
mere associations. The goverament, however, closed all of them down 
after the strikes of the workers at the Eastera Railways and the Istanbul 
Tramcar Company in 1928.·^  And from that year until 1946, workers lacked 
any organisation either in the fonns of associations or unions.
Turkey was ruled by a single party,the Republican People's 
Party (RPP) until the fonnation of the Democratic Party (DP) on 7 January 
1946. " Among the six principles of the RPP - republicanism, nationalism.
populism, etatism, secularism, and refomiism - 'populism' and 'etatism' 
deserve special mention. Populism was the key concept in denying legitimacy 
to any interest group fonned on a class basis, while etatism meant existence 
of a national economy under state control. The conflict limiting potential of 
populism and etatism was used to dominate and control the genesis and 
development of labour and capital organizations."^
Until the late 1940s, three seperate pieces of legislation, adopted 
in 1925, 1936, and 1938 forbade the establishment of " professional 
associations " and those " based on a social class ". They all point to a 
constant legal repression on working-class. For example. Restoration of 
Peace Act (Takrir-i Sukun Kanunu) of 1925 discouraged the establishment 
of class-based organizations and specifically that of trade unions.·· Similaiiy, 
the Penal Code was amended in 1935 to punish strikes and the Labour Law 
of 1936 formally restricted strikes and lockouts by establishing legal 
penalties.^ It also carried a provision on the settlement of industrial disputes 
by compulsoiy state arbitration. Although it was silent on the issue of union 
organization, this was specifically outlawed by the Law of Associations 
adopted two years later. Associations Act of 1938 prohibited the 
establishment of class-based organizations. Therefore, it was virtually 
impossible to fonn trade unions for both workers and employers.
All of these above mentioned pieces of legislation indicate that 
the single-party state, cloaked in the Kemalist fiction of a "classless, castless, 
unified society", showed a paternalistic interest in the problems of labour 
while it rigorously disallowed any self-organization of workers.'' This official 
position adopted by the Republic familiarized the public with a view that was
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largely borrowed from the French sociologist, Emile Durkheim.^ Society, 
according to this view, was an interrelated whole held together by the 
functional division of labour and reinforced by the collective values which 
members shared as a nation. Moreover, there were no classes in society but 
rather strata which arose from the same functional di\dsion of labour. 
Therefore, the function of the state was to aid and protect all the members of 
society as well as to arbitrate among them when conflicts arose. As a result 
of this reasoning, the state's attitude towards labour remained paternalistic 
and active unions were discouraged. During the Kemalist period, all types of 
associations were clearly subordinated to a one-party apparatus and 
authoritaritarian state, which effectively suppressed the expression of interest 
conflict through either pluralist or corporatist channels.^ The single-party 
regime of Turkey did not utilize pluralism, or neo-corporatism, or 
"inclusionary", o r " exclusionary " variants of state corporatism.'" Until 1947, 
the model applied by the state had no relation with corporatism, but it was 
monism detennined by a paternalistic state approach."
As indicated above , the paternalistic attitude of the state 
inhibited trade union development for a long time. However, this policy 
towards union activity began to chajige with the end of the World War II 
which accelarated the process of moderating the principle of etatism that had 
began in late 1930s. The timing was probably related to several other factors 
too, such as dissent at home, emergence of small private sector industrialist 
with the help of the RTF's capitalist-oriented etatism, Turkey's attempt to 
take its place in post-war " Free World " and the government's concem to 
win popular support prior to the first general election under the new multi­
party regime.
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As a result of the change of policy orientation within the RPP 
caused by above mentioned factors, the Law of Associations of 1938 was 
amended in 1946 which lifted the ban on establishing class-based 
associations. Its another important provision fi-eed association fondation from 
government control. Associations could be established without prior 
penuission simply by presenting a copy of group's constitution to the 
Ministry of Intenor and publishing public notice in a newspaper within 
fifteen days of organization's fonnation.’^  It is clear tliat these liberalising 
amendments considerably encouraged associational development throughout 
the post-war era. However, since the 1946 Law of Associations still 
prevented associations from engaging in activities outside their originally 
declared goals, especially from " political activities ", and a legal amendment 
in 1952 made it possible for the government to close them down 
without judicial proceedings, the RPP etatism continued. >■'’
The amendment of 1938 Law of Associations covered the trade 
unions as well. Tlie birth of the labour movement was made possible smiply 
by striking from the Law of Associations the ban against groups based on 
class. Therefore, it was soon followed by the fonnation throughout Turkey of 
600 trade unions, numerous other associations and even two socialist 
p a r t i e s . T h e  number of organizations that arose in the six months 
immediately after the adoption of the 1946 Law of Associations clearly 
suprised the government. The People's Party had expected the development 
of organized labour at a gradual pace and it was alanned by the rapid success 
of opposition leaders in establishing alliances with labour.'·' The workers 
became so politicised that by the end of the year the martial law regime in
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Istanbul closed down all the unions as well as the socialist parties and 
arrested both labour and party leaders, accusing them of being communist 
front organizations.'^ In order to reassert its control over union fonnation and 
activity, the government adopted a seperate Trade Unions Act.
1947 became the year in which unions had their first special law 
in Turkey. Law 5018 entitled " Law on Employees and Employers 'Unions 
and Union Associations " is generally considered by the Turkish social policy 
experts as marking the beginning of Turkish trade unionism.'’ Tliis law 
indeed is celebrated as an important step forward after a long repressive 
period during which even the spelling out of the word " union " had not been 
allowed. However, it should be pointed out that 1947 Law on Workers' and 
Employers' Unions had a ' mixed 'character. Wliile on the one hand " the Act 
had liberal pluralist orientations, on the other hand it heavily relied on the 
role of the state in regulating the relationship between itself and organized 
labour and capital.
1947 Act brouglit the fragmenting and isolating strategy of 
"debilitating pluralism" to the labour m o v e m e n t . I t  gave peraiission to 
establish trade unions and employers' associations in certain industries, but 
the real intent of the law was to " promote a multitude of competing, small 
local unions, deprived of any substantial economic functions, prohibiting 
from fonning open political alliances, and dependent upon the good will of 
the government in promoting the welfare of their members. In this period, 
the goals of the RPP state elite was " to keep a tight control on the fonn and 
the substance of Turkish trade unionism so as to make it subservient to the 
overall policy goals of the state. Therefore, the State introduced a pluralist
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strateg)^ of allowing voluntary, multiple, competitive, autonomous interest 
organizations in order to make it more vulnerable to state monitoring. This 
goal was achieved by the imposition of state controls which could be 
identified as state corporatism : the state elite was directly involved in the 
organization of an official union via a ' labour office ' within the RPP; strikes 
were illegal and participating unions could be closed down by the courts up 
to one year; unions had the riglit to negotiate collective agreements for 
their members, but prohibition against strikes made meanmgful bargainings 
ahnost hupossible in practise so that industrial conflicts were subjected to 
compulsory arbitration; leadership of the labour movement was isolated from 
undesired political contammation by stipulation that unions could not 
" engage in politics, political propaganda or publication " and could not 
" become the instruments of a political organizations Tlie act also 
encouraged rival unionism by pemiitting an unlimited number of 
organizations in the same work branch and allowed multiple membership 
without providing any mechanism for settling disputes over representation. 
The principle of voluntary membership was strictly applied to prevent the 
fonnation of union shops. Federation or affiliation with any type of multi­
union organization required a formal endorsement from two thirds of the 
membership. Affiliation with international organizations was pennitted with 
approval from the Council of Ministers, but this was not granted for 
affiliation with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions until 
1960.
" The provisions of the 1947 Act were not devised against any 
actual threat of a sigiificant labour movement or ideology, but were part of 
a strategy to prevent the subsequent emergence of autonomous unions that
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are not dependent on the state. In this respect, it is possible to characterise 
this policy as " preemptive cooptation " type of the Colliers' four different 
varieties of state corporatism .In  this type of the system which is placed on 
the constraints-oriented side of the continuum, state is able to retain effective 
control over the nascent labour movements without widespread and sustained 
coercion, and it tries to avoid a future labour problem by applying strong 
control over the development potential of labour tlirough corporative 
provisions. Although this policy was firstly initiated by the RPP, it was more 
extensively applied under rhe DP rule.
II. DEMOCRATIC PARTY PERIOD : 1950-60
The Democratic Party's fonnation internally from the ruling 
elite of the RPP in 1946 signified a change in policy towards labour 
organisations. The DP which held power in Turkey from 1950 through 1960 
had come to office with a liberal program and promised to recognise the 
labour's right to strike and free bargaining in its 1949 Program, and repeated 
this promise once in office, in the program of the First Menderes Government 
in 1950.-'' These promises, however, were never kept by the DP and its 
governments. On the contrary, " it shaped, dominated and incorporated the 
labour movement into the political system along the lines similar to the RPP. 
The DP's approach to the labour sector was ' non-pluralist' and closer to a 
pattern of state corporatism. "2·'
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In tenns of the political-organizational variables employed by 
Stepan to distinguish favourable and unfavourable conditions for the 
implementation of state corporatist policies-^, inclusionary authoritarian 
strategies of corporatism did not face much obstacles in Turkey during the 
DP period. As it was mentioned in the first chapter, Stepan regards a high 
degree of autonomous party and interest group organization as the most 
serious obstacle to both tlie inclusionary and exclusionary' types of 
corporatism, because the greater potential for opposition increases the^costs 
of widespread coercion.^·  ^ Wlien Turkey is examined, one may observe low 
associational autonomy during that period which could have facilitated the 
adoption of inclusionary state coiporatism. Second, Stepan considers a high 
degree of ideological polarization as favourable to exlusionary and 
unfavourable to inclusionary strategies.U nder the DP rule, there was not an 
ideological polarization. On the contrary, the two parties had tacitly agreed 
not to make any concessions to the workers, and they were both committed 
to the prevailing Cold War ideology."^ Finally, Stepan regards a low degree of 
social welfare legislation as favourable to inclusionary strategies because it 
leaves the elite substantial " reform space " for incorporating lower class 
groups by initiating redistributive measures and conditioning the receipt of 
benefits on the acceptance of new state-controlled associations.Concem ing 
the Turkish case, it was exactly what happened during this period. The DP 
was generous in distributing material benefits to the working-class, but it was 
conditional on their restraint from getting involved in politics. As a result, 
one may conclude that in terms of Stepan's variables, conditions favouring 
the inclusionary rather than the exclusionary fonn of state corporatism 
existed under the DP rule.
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In addition to suitable political conditions, economic conditions 
were also favourable for the emergence of state corporatism under the DP 
rule. In this respect, Schmitter’s argument to associate the emergence of 
authoritarian state corporatism with the delayed, dependent capitalist 
development seems valid when Turkish case is taken into consideration. 
Similarly, O'Donnell's \dews emphasising economic imperatives in the 
emergence of varieties of state corporatism seem to cany' an explanatory' 
value for the Turkish case. In tenns of O'Donnell's distinction between two 
varieties of state corporatism,·''' Turkey under the DP rule can be put into the 
category of " incorporating populist-authoritarian system s", associated with 
the early phase of import substitution. During the DP period, Turkey was still 
in the early phase of " easy " import substitution which enabled the DP to 
implement welfare programs. In fact, by tliese welfare policies the DP laid 
the foundations of extended intenial market which was part of the import 
substitution strategy of the period. Therefore, the government often provided 
more benefits than the union representatives had demanded while 
consistently rejecting their requests for a greater role in decision making and 
program administration.
The policy of DP was not an exclusionary fonn of state 
corporatism aimed at repressing and excluding worker class demands. 
Indeed, " legislation for improvement of working and living conditions, 
health serv'ice, housing provisions, tax exemptions, bonuses and minimum 
wages for the workers were enacted and implemented without the initiative 
of Turk-Is, the national labour confederation, set up on July 31 1952."-’2 
However, while incorporating the ordinary members of labour through 
inducements such as welfare legislation, the DP always excluded Turk-Is
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from decision-taking process. The confederation was never able to 
establish itself as the recognized spokesman for the labour movement. The 
DP sought labour support by ignoring the union leadership and directly 
distributing the material benefits to the rank and file.”  Turk-ls leaders were 
told by several ministers of labour that government had no need for 
" intennediate channels " in addressing the workers.”  " The Democrat’s 
strategy involved denying any credit to union intennediation for even 
transitory improvements in workers' material conditions, directly seeking’ 
electoral support from tlie rank and file by making a modest budgetary 
cominitment to housing and welfare programs, and using repression and 
police harrasment against whatever specific discontent remained."”  
Although the DP is generally inteipreted as ' populist ’, it did not try to use 
labour organizations as a vehicle for mobizing and incorporating the popular 
sector. Instead, it excluded them from politics. Tliis can be explained by the 
fact that the DP was not wholly dependent on working class support. The 
power base of the party consisted of big fanners, merchants and the nascent 
industrialists.”  Therefore, the DP did not attempt to mobilize labour 
organizations in support of its populist policies.
The DP's independence from the political support of organized 
labour also explains why the government relied more on the " constraints " 
to impose new controls over union activity and leadership selection rather 
than on " inducements " to win the cooperation and political support of 
labour leaders. Wlien Colliers' framework for distinguishing varieties of 
state corporatism is employed,”  Turkey could be placed on the more 
constraints oriented side of the continuum. The DP applied many constraints 
during its rule. First, Although the DP had promised to recognise labour's
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right to strike in 1949 and 1950 programines, when it caine to power it chose 
to dominate the labour movement through sustaining the pre-existing 
authoritarian system of interest representation. Until 1961, article 5 of the 
1947 Act banning the political activity was used by the government as the 
" sword of Damocles " over the unions.^* A striking example is the 
prohibition of a meeting organised by the union of Istanbul Textile and 
Knitting Industries Workers in 1952 in order to "promote the use of 
domestic products and to protest unemployment" on the grounds that such a 
meeting would imply political involvement of labour. Moreover, the 
government encouraged the apolitical trend among the workers by having the 
unions organised by American experts. They introduced the notion that 
unions should have no affiliation with any political party (as they did in 
Britain); instead (as in the US) they should lobby and bargain for economic 
concessions with the party in power. Turk-Is which was set up in 1952 with 
extensive aid and support from the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU) adopted this philosophy. This kind of unionism soon came 
to be knowm as American Unionism.-^®
Although the DP had prohibited almost every function of unions 
because it perceived them as political activities, it did not hesitate to politicise 
the unions along its own line.'*'’ However, as the confederation's frustrated 
leaders mcreasingly relied on the support of the People's Party, the 
goverainent began to interpret all union criticisms of its policies as illegal 
political activity. While Clause 5 of the authoritarian Labbour Code of 1947 
banned unions from pursuing political activities, " the top cadres of Turk-Is 
were exclusively recruited from among strong DP partisans. In fact, when in 
1955-57 most administrative posts of Turk-Is were still in the hands of the
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RPP sympathizers, the government openly threatened to close down Turk-Is. 
The crisis was overcome by the election of an openly DP partisan, Nuri 
Baser, as the leader. The change in leadership allowed Turk-Is to retain its 
subsidy from the government and to preser\^e its symbolic position as the 
peak organization of the labour movement. Yet the confederation remained 
as powerless as ever. The DP used the ambitions of union leaders to become 
a deputy as well. " This double faced policy of banning political acti\ity and 
then co-opting union leaders into the DP set the pattern of dependency of 
labour unions on the state for any organizational and policy benefits and 
became a disturbing source of weakness in Turkish trade union movement in 
the years to come.
Another constraint mechanism employed by the DP is related to 
the unions’ financial resources . In order to make them dependent on itself, it 
limited membership dues to 120 T.L. per year.^^ In addition, it used 
punishment fees which were an important source of revenue for unions as 
another constraint. These resources were allocated partisanly by the Ministiy 
of Labour and discrimination was made between unions that were regarded 
as too friendly to the opposition or to the DP.
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Chapter Three 
1960-80 ERA
L LABOUR AND STATE DURING 1960s
1960s represent something of a milestone in Turkish history. 
The military coup took place in 1960 for the first time in the history of 
Turkish Republic and the subsequent military rule lasted until the restoration 
of civilian power in 1961. " The military coup carried particular features 
distinguishing it from the armed interventions in 1971 and 1980. Since it was 
a reaction against the authoritarian rule of the Democrat Party, in the Ime 
with the outlook of the social groups that fonned the bases of opposition 
against the DP and support for the coup ( the intellegensia and the 
civilian/military bureacracy), the coup had democratic-refonnist orientations. 
The specific project of the coup makers was to set up the institutions of a 
Western European type of democracy but from above."'
Two factors that emerged in this period lend the . decade a 
particular complexity and interest. First, the constitution promulgated in 1961 
after the military coup extended democratic rights.^ It emphasized liberal 
pluralist freedoms and social and economic rights and duties. It can be 
argued tliat in this group of new riglits and freedoms, no category has proved 
to be as important as the one granted to labour.^ The rights to organise, to 
bargain collectively, and to strike were the basic rights guaranteed to labour
by articles 46 and 47 of the 1961 Constitution/ In addition to these basic 
rights, the new constitution also contained many provisions on work 
conditions, paid holidays, wage equity and social security. Based on the new 
constitution, two further acts respecting trade unions and collective 
bargainings, strikes and lockouts, namely Law 274 and 275, were enacted in 
1963.^ Both the 1961 Constitution and these two acts tried to establish a 
balance by fonning interest groups, trade unions and other constitutional 
institutions against the past authoritarian tendencies of the parliament under 
the DP rule " Tliey were marked by a concern for diffiising political power 
in society and aimed at adding new groups to the social bases of politics, that 
is, setting up pluralist power centers in the fonn of interest associations over 
a broad range of ideological, economic and social orientations juxtaposed to 
the state. Pnis orientation of coup makers towards diffusing political 
power in society provided greater scope for social and political 
organisations, opposition and critical thought. The Turkish Workers Party 
was founded early in the decade and scored some rapid parliamentary 
successes. Militant youth organizations emerged. Publication of and 
widespread discussion of socialist ideology multiplied. Strikes, now 
legalized, became commonplace.
The second factor that coincided with these developments 
mentioned above was the rapid economic development. Their combination, 
that is rapid trajisfonnation of socioeconomic structures, imposed severe 
strains on the existing structures of Turkish society.* The economic policy of 
this era placed increasing emphasis on planned development. The principal 
goals of economic policy were more rapid and concentrated industrialisation 
and manufacture of goods that could be competitive in foreign markets to
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achieve ultimate integration into the European Economic Community by the 
1990s. However, these ambitious aims necessitated greater coordination of 
the public and private sectors. Therefore, public policy toward associations 
became a key element in the attempt to reconcile rapid economic 
development with democracy and to avoid a return to overt authoritarian 
rule.^ " Policy toward associations sought to encourage cooperative interest 
group leaders in the major economic sectors to share responsibility for 
implementing developmental progi'ams and to voluntaiily moderate demands 
and make sacrifices for political participation and economic redistribution. As 
series of weak governments in pursuit of increasingly ambitious economic 
goals were confronted with growing demands from a politically more 
organized and concious citizenry and with resulting crises of participation 
and distribution, tliey attempted to achieve their aims by means of general 
corporatisation of associational interest representation, "'o
Related to above mentioned political and economic objectives of 
policy makers, the model emerged in the organization of labour in this era 
was still on the state corporatist side of the continuum. However, as different 
from the 1950-60 era, there w a s " more emphasis on corporatist inducements 
than on constraints .Throughout  1960s and 1970s, the neo-coiporatist 
mechanisms of trade-offs in tenns of both constraints and inducements were 
used in order to secure the collaboration of major interest group leaders for 
realising ambitious economic and political aims as mentioned above. 
Although this cooperation between the state and main interest groups 
resembled something near neo-corporatism,'^ it would be still more 
appropriate to characterise it as an example of state corporatism due to the 
fact that even the experiment with societal corporatism in Turkey was state
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initiated and state directed.’·^ " It is clear that the initiative for the 
coiporatisation of labour unions has caine primarily from tlie state's attempt 
to co-opt reliable clients who are willing to share responsibility for policy 
implementation and not from a confident and agressive set of union leaders 
seeking to translate preexisting organizational strength into a greater role in 
policy fonnation."'^ Although legal acts adopted after 1960 had positive 
effects on labour unions, they were still weak, insecure and manipulable 
associations. Therefore, they generally welcomed state-initiatives in return 
for official recognition and privileges to improve their political and economic 
positions immediately and in the l o n g - r u n .In this respect, Schmitter's 
differentiation between state and liberal variants of corporatism does not 
seem utilisible for characterising Turkish case.’^  He describes autlioritarian 
state corporatism as being coersively imposed " from above " in contexts of 
delayed dependent development, while liberal corporatism evolves " from 
below " in contexts of advanced welfare state capitalism. However, when 
compared to Western European experiences, the Turkish brand of liberal 
corporatism is unusual, because it does not emerge spontaneously from 
below, but is imposed from above in the absence of advance capitalist 
deve lopment . " It has resulted primarily from the efforts of government to 
create series of cartels in the major economic sectors and to draw them into a 
centralised state bargaining process that would facilitate planned economic 
development."'^
As indicated above, the model of interest representation system 
in the labour sector was more close to state corporatist variant in 1960s even 
though it earned some elements of societal corporatism. However, the 1960s 
was also different from the previous decade, because there was more reliance
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on coiporatist inducements than on cons t ra in t s .1971-80 period, however, 
witnessed increasing constraints on the labour sector as a response to 
growing radicalisation, militancy and fragmentation of the labour 
movement. 20
When the Colliers' identification of four different varieties of 
state coiporatism along a continuum of " contraints-oriented " and 
" inducements-oriented " arrangements is employed,^' Turkey under the 
Democratic Party rule seems more on the " preemptive co-optation " type of 
the constraints oriented side of the continuum. According to the Colliers' 
categorisation, in this type of the system, elites have exercised early and 
continuous influence over the development of nascent labour movements. By 
gradually increasing both constraints and inducements, they have encouraged 
the cooperation of weak union leaders. This allowed the state to have 
effective control over growing labour movements without widespread and 
sustained coercion. On the other hand, the period after the military coup of 
1960 seems more on the inducements-oriented side of the continuum. In this 
type of categorisation, labour emerges as an essential support group, but 
because of the still weak and disorganised structure of unionism, 
governments are able to use inducements to create labour movements from 
above and keep them under control.
The Colliers argue that certain inclusionary arrangements have 
differed so much from other varieties of state corporatism that they may be 
considered emerging fonns of societal corporatism. According to them, 
during certain periods, adopted policies towards labour movements can be 
so heavily inducements-oriented and so clearly tied to the search for working
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class support that they appear to be intenuediate cases between state and 
societal corporatism.-- These arguments seem to be valid for Turkish case 
especially when governments' great reliance on inducements rather than 
constraints over labour unions in 1960-71 era is taken into consideration. 
During this period, governments' policies towards labour unions were heavily 
inducements-oriented in order to secure their collaboration for realising 
ambitious political ajid economic aims. As a result of this emphasis on 
inducements, the model emerged in the organisation of labour in 1960-71 era 
could also be characterised as an " intennediate or hybrid case " between 
State and societal corporatism.
" There were three basic categories of inducements offered to 
the Turkish working class between 1960 and 1971. The first was the 
progiessive welfare legislation, chiefly initiated by the right-of-center 
successor of the Democratic Party, the Justice Party (IP) which remained in 
power with absolute majorities fi'om 1965 to 1971."-4 Many issues were 
addressed by the legislation. For instance, 1961 Constitution had a new 
emphasis on social security and minumum wages for employees; 1961 Law 
on State Retirement Fund (no.228) combined the previous legislation on 
retirement, insurance and health services; 1964 Minumum Wage Regulations 
brought arrangements concerning minumum wage; 1964 Social hisurance 
Act (no. 506) covered retirement fund and insurance of employees in the case 
of employment injiiiy, occupational disease, illness, and disability; 1969 
Labour Law (no.931) outlawed Labour Code of 1936 and regulated 
employment, individual contracts, compensation, working conditions, hours, 
health and safety, severance pay, and layoffs; 1969 Decree on Employement 
and Working Conditions of Pregnant Women and Mothers with Dependent
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Children (по.6/11 645) regulated the work conditions and paid time off for 
pregnant women and m o t h e r s . " Together with the rising tendency in real 
wages between 1963 and 1971, these legislations gi'anted the working class 
greater privileges and rights compared with other less developed countries.
In fact, these welfare state redistributions in the 1960s were possible thanks 
to the rapid economic development resulting from positive international 
conjuncture.^^ Statistical figures show that economic growth, and particularly 
industrial growth, w^ as very rapid in the 1960s. Between 1960 and 1970, the 
GDP index rose from 63.6 to 110.5, while the index of industrial GDP rose 
even more sharply from 45.0 to 113.5. In tlie same period, manufacturing 
workplaces more than doubled. By 1970, 173,000 workers, 20 percent of the 
industrial workforce, worked in factories employing more than 1,000 
workers.'^
The second category of inducements offered to the Turkish 
working class was Turk-Is's access to the decision making process within the 
state.29 The Constitution's framers had thought that accelerated 
industrialisation required a more centralised system of industrial relations that 
would necessitate the support of reliable labour leaders. Tlierefore, tripartite 
commissions including representatives from government, employers' 
associations and labour unions were fomied which drafted two key pieces of 
legislation - a new Trade Unions Act and a Law on Strikes, Lockout and 
Collective Agreements. According to these pieces of legislation, " Turk-ls 
representatives together with the main employers' bodies sat officially in 
special commissions of the State Planning Organisation, Minimum Wages 
Commissions, Executive Councils of Public Economic Enterprises and other 
public bodies in a way reminiscent of an institutionalised cooperation with
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the state in making and implementing public policies which is an important 
dimension of neo-corporatism in the West."-^ '^
The third categoiy of inducements was related to provisions 
aiming at strengthening the orgajiisational framework of Turk-Is. These 
inducements were fomialised in the second Labour Code of the Turkish 
Republic enacted in 1963, the Act on Trade Unions (Act no.274) and the Act 
on Collective Bargaining, Strikes and Lockouts (Act no.275). The main 
provisions under this heading are official recognition, monopoly of 
representation, compulsory membership and state help in ensuring a regular 
source of income for unions."^’ According to these two Acts, which were 
generally refered as " twin laws order to promote indushy'-wide
unionisation and centralisation, geographic federations were eliminated and 
conditions for affiliation were eased. In addition, union shops were still 
prohibited but greater financial security was provided for dues collection. As 
an important coq^oratist inducement, the common practise of free-riding was 
discouraged by requiring non-union members to pay "solidarity 
contributions" amounting to two thirds of regular dues in order to enjoy the 
benefits of collective agreements negotiated by the union. " By this back-door 
strategy, in this decade Turk-Is was equipped with elements of organisational 
superiority without the impetus coming from below.
All of these provisions for strengthening union organisation 
closely paralleled Turk-Is's aim of establishing itself as the sole representative 
of a more centralised labour movement. The confederation leadership hoped 
that it might achieve the acceptance by the government and the unions of its 
claim to act as the only authoritative spokesman for Turkish labour.
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However, in spite of centralisation and monopolisation desires of Turk-ls, the 
organising principle of the Labour Code was pluralist.^' Several key aspects 
of the new Trade Unions Act were fi'ustrating Turk-Is's goal of " few'er 
unions and more members " because they preserved rival unionism and 
maintained govemmenfs ability to fragment labour organisation. 
no.275 and 275 encouraged multiplicity of unionism, caused " union 
inflation " and accelarated the establishment of small and ineffective unions 
vulnerable to political influence and employer control.·’^  These acts pemhtted
an unlimited number of unions in each work branch and allowed multiple 
voluntary membership. Moreover, the Ministry of Labour remained as the 
only body authorised to decide on work branches that structure union 
organisations. While Turk-Is demanded German model of centralised 
unionisation with as few as fifleen national federations, the government 
insisted on keeping a highly differentiated list of about thirty-five industrial 
categories. These encouragements of multiple organisations in highly 
fragmented work branches made the emergence of large amount of 
authoritisation disputes possible. However, no mechanism was established for 
their resolution other than applying to courts.·*^
These weaknesses in the union structure further motivated Turk- 
Is to intensify its efforts towards centralisation. With the help of the state, it 
reduced work branches to 24 in 1964, with a national union in each.^^ 
However, within this problematic legal ffamew'ork, Turk-ls's efforts to 
establish a single national union in each industrial sector quickly alienated 
unionists who refused to accept confederation's discipline, and led many 
jurisdictional disputes with militant independent and left-wing organisations. 
This was the case in early 1966, in the strike at the Pasabahce glass factory.
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The local union, Ki'istal-Is, attempted to break through the existing 
industry wide agreement. Turk-ls agreed with the employers' rejection of 
this, and tried to play a role of safety valve for the working class movement. 
It declared the strike illegal before any court ruling to this eifect. Moreover, 
despite the protests of the workers on strike, Turk-Is sigied a protocol with 
the employers' confederation to end the strike. Nevertheless, a number of 
Turk-Is affiliated unions refused to comply with the protocol and supported 
the strikers. In eighty-three days of the strike, they collected 460,000 Turkish 
Liras as an impressive show of solidarity for the striking workers.'»'* Turk-Is 
responded by suspending six unions from the confederation. A few months 
later, in Februaiy 1967, some of the suspended unions - Maden-Is, Basin-Is, 
Lastik-Is, Bank-Is, Yapi-Is - cajne together to fonn DISK, the Confederation 
of Progressive Trade Unions.
Even thougli DISK was second to the Turk-Is in tenns of 
membership, it has played a far more active and effective role in the union 
and political affairs of the country given the number of its members.'»’ 
Towards the end of 1970s, it was able to attract new members due to its 
growing popularity among workers. In 1980, while the right-wing Turk-Is 
had thirty affiliated industrywide unions with 1,970,000 members, the left- 
oriented DISK had twenty-eight affiliated unions with claimed 1,635,000 
members.''- It indicated that Turk-Is's centralisation efforts were not 
successful. The reasons of DISK’S effectiveness can be summarised as 
follows;'”' First, DISK had a g'eater appeal to the urbanised working classes 
with increasing radical tendencies. In contrast with the Turk-Is, which has 
always stressed professional issues of unionism, DISK argued that 
professional and political issues make up a whole. It openly advocated
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political stRiggle as indispensible for advancing the interests of the working 
class and declared Turk-Is's " above-party, bread and butter unionism as a 
mask for collaboration with bourgeois politicians in an attempt to supress 
class strugle."' '^' Second, while Turk-Is has recognised the existing 
sociopolitical order as its starting point, DISK was engaged in a fight against 
it. DISK based its activities on the class struggle wheras Turk-Is tried to 
promote national consciousness and hannony. Third, while Turk-Is is 
comprised mainly of unions in the state industrial establislunents, DISK as 
Turk-Is's chief rival was active in private and foreign owned workplaces and 
among civil seiwice workers in municipalities.DISK'S choice of private 
sector as its target has helped to create an image as the real representative of 
labour in class struggle.Lastly, DISK was successful in identifying its rival 
w'ith negative aspects of the existing system. This strategy discredited Turk-Is 
in the eyes of workers.
The founding of DISK sharpened the conflict between workers 
and their employers, and accelerated the process of politicisation.^’ As DISK 
became more active and effective, the employers encouraged so-called 
yellow unions that are affiliated to Turk-Is in order to keep the unions in 
their factories under control. However, such kinds of actions discredited 
Turk-Is even more in the eyes of the workers. Turk-Is had great difficulty in 
limiting the radicalisation and militancy of its own rank and file. Even when 
it organised demonstrations in support of economic demands, Turk-Is 
together with the government took prohibitory measures to prevent any 
spontaneous acts in favour of DISK.
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As the economis crisis reduced rates of profit and the popularity 
of DISK associated with political unionism grew, the ruling class represented 
by both of the major parties ( The JP and the RPP ) felt threatened and 
decided to actri* In 1970, the JP government with the support of the RPP 
desired to move away from the pluralism of the 1963 legislation and opt for 
more unitai'y labour organisation under Turk-Is control. As a result, two 
discriminatory amendments were made to tire Labour Code which aimed at 
gi'anting Turk-Is an effective representational monopoly at the national level 
and eliminating its rivals. The crucial amendment specified that a trade union 
could organise nationally only if it represented at least one-third of the 
workers in that particular branch of industry. The purpose of this legislation 
was to destroy DISK and prevent the growth of its influence and to re­
establish Turk-ls as the only labour organisation that is open to governments' 
and employers' demands. In fact, the government openly declared its 
intention in public. The Ministry of Labour announced that " unions which 
have became tools of ideological movements [ i.e., DISK-affiliated unions ] 
will automatically be abolished as soon as the law is passed.
DISK lobbied against this unjust legislation and tried to prevent 
the passage of the bill. However, when its efforts failed, it planned a mass 
demonstration against it. But before its plans were complete, it was faced 
with a fait accompli; factory workers, particularly DISK members in and 
around Istanbul left their tools and went out of the factories into the streets. 
This spontaneous response of the working class caught both the ruling class 
and also DISK leadership by suprise.-'^ The demonstration began on 15 June 
1970 with about 70,000 workers from over 100 factories. They blocked the 
Istanbul-Ankara highway. The authorities mobilised the security forces
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including the anny and declared martial law in the Mamiara industrial region 
on 16 June. However, workers were anned with clubs and they fought battles 
with police and soldiers on June 15 and 16. Three workers were killed along 
with a policeman and a shopkeeper, hundreds were wounded and many 
others were taken into custody. Tliese first spontaneous, large-scale 
political actions of working class in Turkey signalled the coming of age of 
increasing polarisation, politicisation and radicalisation in the labour sector.·"*
In return for the organisational privileges such as legislation 
granting Turk-Is monopoly of representation and centralisation and providing 
welfare concessions provided to working class, " the state imposed legal and 
de facto constraints on the unions to secure their commitment for maintaining 
social peace."■ ‘^2 x|-,e fjj-st constraint was " state inteiwention in collective 
bargaining over wages and working conditions by authorising state approved 
strikes but outlawing strikes against national security and those 
undertaken for political reasons. Second, the substance of collective 
agreements was controlled by the state, which fixed wages by its fiscal 
provisions. And, third, the legislature intervened in the area of labour 
employer relations by stipulating when a labour dispute would be mediated 
by administrative and/or judicial decisions.
In addition to these constraints,.probably the most important part 
of the corporatist deal was the " above party politics " policy adopted by 
Turk-Is in exchange for organisational and welfare concessions. According to 
a resolution adopted by the Fifth Convention in 1964, Turk-Is decided " to 
remain absolutely independent vis-a-vhs political parties and associated 
bodies thereof, and pursue an above party policy."·"  ^ In theoiy, this meant
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that, it did not have an alliance with any political party and it did not guide its 
members' votes in general elections. It advocated only the bread-and-butter 
type of job unionism. In the minds of Turk-Is executives, above party politics 
policy was in the same line with the prohibition imposed by the trade unions 
law on the establishment of organic links with political bodies.
Although the 1963 Trade Unions Act was highly liberal 
concerning the establislmient of labour organisations, it was rather restrictive 
about their involvement in politics. Article 16 of the trade unions law stated 
under the heading of " Prohibited Political Activities " that " Professional 
bodies fonued under this law are prohibited from granting or receivmg any 
pecuniary assistance in any fonu to or from any political party or associated 
bodies thereof and also from making up a part of any political party's 
structure; establishing a professional organisation under the name of any 
political paity is also prohibited. Hence, the law not only prohibited 
establishment of any organic links between political parties and unions, but 
also banned them from receiving any financial support from political parties 
or contributing to thein.-'^ ^
Despite some of its prohibitory provisions, 1963 Trade Unions 
Act was more liberal than the previous one concerning the politicaf activities 
of labour unions.·''  ^ Tliere was a marked difference between the 1947 Trade 
Unions Act and that of 1963. In the fonner, " unions were banned from any 
political activity, and the definition of the political was made by the ruling 
parties. This had the consequence of political parties being unresponsive to 
the demands of the unions."·'*' On the other hand, the latter did not prohibit all 
kinds of political activities. In fact, the above-quoted aiticle of 1963 law did
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not say an>1hing preventing labour unions from working as pressure groups 
or supporting any political party in elections. Therefore, unions could freely 
engage in political affairs, However, governments' attitudes remained as 
prohibitory' as it was b e fo r e .A  clear example of this situation could be 
observed in 1965 general elections in which Turk-Is had launched a political 
campaign. The confederation had prepared a " blacklist " to prevent the re- 
election of ten members of pai'liament from various parties who had claimed 
to have taken anti-labour attitudes and worked against the interests of 
w orkers .T he  campaign resulted with success and eight of the MP's could 
not return to parliament. However, based upon this activity, Turk-Is 
headquarters were searched and propaganda leaflets found there were 
confiscated. As this event indicated, the governments still continued their old 
pattern of behaviour and regarded even some pure pressure-group actions as 
falling within the category of prohibited political activities.
As mentioned above, the official policy of Turk-Is was to " not 
get involved in politics ". However, many union leaders and some top 
officials of Turk-Is entered parliament on the party lists of the major political 
parties. In fact, even thougli the Confederation -opposed political unionism, 
all the affiliates and the confederation itself had close unofficial contacts with 
different political parties.6-·' The executive board of Turk-Is cooperated with 
almost all center-right parties, particularly with the JP. Some of the major 
affiliates of the organisation, which had an important influence in the 
executive board elections, joined forces with the neo-fascist Nationalist 
Action Party, The only group that has openly advocated the necessity of 
cooperation with a political party to ensure a labour union's success was the 
social democratic faction within Turk-ls. This faction emerged in the early
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1970s and believed in the necessity of political activity to implement social 
refomis and improve the living and working conditions of the workers. Their 
policy was in the line with the RPP. It is obvious that " changes in attitude 
and leadership that took place in the RPP after 1965 affected the leadership 
of many unions associated with Turk-Is."^^ The RPP's adoption o f " left-of- 
center " policy and " democratic left " label had attracted the labour as a 
whole. The leader of the new movement in the RPP, Bulent Eceett, invited 
Turk-ls to cooperate with the RPP. He stated that the above party policy of 
the confederation was undemftning the strength of labour. -^  ^ Ecevifs 
cooperation calls directed at the Turk-Is had some important effects. By the 
mid-1970s, the number of social-democratic unions within Turk-Is was 24, 
representing 40 percent of the total membership of Turk-Is.°^ In the 1973 
general elections and the 1977 partial elections, the social-democratic 
faction of Tiirk-Is supported the RPP, indicating that they did not consider 
above party politics policy as a valid principle. However, in general, the 
social-democratic faction was unable to change Turk-Is's overall line of not 
getting involved in politics.^’
Unlike Turk-Is, DISK regarded " above party politics" policy as 
a mask for collaboration with bourgeois politicians. It blamed Turk-Is being a 
loyal follower of American type of trade unionism. DISK argued that 
economic and political issues make up a whole. Therefore, it openly 
advocated political struggle as indispensable for promoting the interests of 
working-class. From the very beginning, DISK had aimed at securing labour 
a role in the administration of the country. It wished to promote labour to the 
status of a " decision-maker" factor in the government. This general policy 
line was also stated in the " Basic Piinciple " section of the DISK statute.
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Paragraph (e) of Article 3 read as follows ; " It is not possible to gain the 
rights of the labour through economic struggle only. To achieve this, the 
labour, by using its democratic rights provided by the constitution, should 
engage in political battle. Tliis battle, by rendering the labour fully conscious 
of its existence, will put an end to the exploitation of men by men."**^  
Advocating this view, DISK employed all kinds of instruments of political 
struggle including demonsration, boycott, factory occupation, slowing dowm 
the work, sit-ins etc. In 1967-71 period, these actions of DISK led to 
violence and battles with the police in which many people were killed or 
wounded. In addition to these actions, following its foundation, DISK openly 
supported the Turkish Labour Party (TLP) in the first general elections which 
took place in 1969 and at these elections many DISK executives ran for 
pai'liainent on the TLP lists.H ow ever, the election results showed that this 
policy was not effective since only one among the candidates of DİSK was 
elected.
II. 1971-80 PERIOD
Turk-ls's above party stand was part of the corporatist deal as 
mentioned above. Turk-Is had a heterogenous character and there Avere many 
factions within it supporting different parties. It was Turk-ls's strategy to 
replace its own executives belonging to the opposition by the ones supporting 
the ruling party. In return, Turk-Is leaders hoped to have some benefits such 
as monopoly of representation, official recognition etc. However, in the 
atmosphere of increasing radicalisation and polarisation of 1970s, as Turk-Is
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acquired greater government, business and militai7  support for 
representational monopoly to eliminate its rivals, it lost its control over 
increasingly militajit rank-and-file.Thus, although the coiporatist above - 
paity politics strategy aimed at ’’ avoiding divisive impact of politics on the 
union movement and promoting the organisational strength of Turk-Is, it 
produced effects which were the opposite of the ones that were intended."''·
In the end, the corporatist deal produced more fragmentation 
and instability. In addition to DISK and social-democratic faction within 
Turk-Is, five more small unions were set up in 1970s.’- First of them w'as the 
Confederation of Nationalist Workers' Unions ( MISK ) which w'as 
supporting extreme right-wing, the Nationalist Action Party. The second one 
w’as the Confederation of Turkish Just Workers' Unions ( HAK-IS ) wiiich 
supported the pro-Islamic National Salvation Paity. Three remaining smaller 
unions with no significant role in Turkish labour movement were the 
Confederation of Social Democrat Workers' Unions ( SOSYAL 
DEMOKICA.T-IS ), the Confederation of Turkish Nationalist Pro-Justice 
Women's Labour Unions ( TURK ULKE-IS ), and the Confederation of 
Turkish Communist Workers' Unions ( TOPLUM-IS ). All of these rival 
confederations competing against Turk-ls w'ere rejecting the above-paity 
politics strategy of Turk-Is. The inevitable result of this fragmentation which 
W'as brought by the corporatist trade-off was " ineffectiveness and reduction 
in the bargaining power of the labour movement as a whole which in the end 
seiwed the interests of business. This weakness in tum eroded the bases for 
the coiporatist concessions and compromises made wdth Turk-Is in return for 
keeping its rank-and-file under control."’  ^ In this respect, establishment of
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DİSK and other confederations can be accepted as a success for the 
dominant classes.’^
As a result of the weakening of Turkish working class, many 
anti-labour provisions were enacted in eaiiy 1970s by the military backed 
governments. In fact, towards the end of 1960s, the JP governments became 
alanned by the growing tendency of labour unions to collaborate with 
opposition and get involved in politics. However, Demirel governments 
generally not applied severe repression, because they did not want to provide 
the military with an excuse to overtlirow them. Rather, they stressed 
increasing ideological polarisation, violence and threat of anarchy in order to 
justify their demands for drafting a new associations law. They thought that it 
would enable them to establish government controls over all associations 
including labour unions.'·“' Although the JP was unable to provide two-thirds 
legislative majority necessary for the constitutional revision, it w'as done by 
the inter-paity goveniment set up by the militaiy junta after March 1971. In 
1972 new' Law' of Associations was drafted for the regulation of voluntaiy' 
groups which brought many limitations concerning the political activities of 
unions. The Section 1 of the Law stated that " to support or to oppose a 
specific political party, or to establish cooperation among political parties, or 
to support or prevent the victory of a poitical party or any of its candidates or 
of independent candidates in elections for paiJiament, local or precinct 
offices, or to establish cooperation among these candidates " was 
p ro h ib ite d .I t  broadened the government authority for the continuous 
control and inspection of associations' internal organisations and operations.
65
Although the RPP appplied to the Constitutional Court to amend 
the new associations law and the court revised some of its provisions, it did 
not seriously challenge governments' broad powers of interv'ention. 
Therefore, " throughout the 1970s , coalition governments led by the Justice 
Party were able to revive and expand the old Democratic Party practice of 
selective repression by strictly enforcing the law against the troublesome 
student and labour organisations while tolerating or encouraging its wolation 
by supporters of its right-wing coaltion partners."’’ In fact, this combination 
of control and privilege was the most obvious characteristic of corporatism as 
pointed out in Schmitter's definition ; " grant of a deliberate representational 
monopoly in exchange for observing some controls on their selection of 
leaders and articulation of demands and supports."’*
The aim of the military in making the coup and bringing about 
these prohibitoiy legal provisions was to maintain social peace and to 
accelarate the pace of economic development. The basic problem of Turkish 
politics after 1971 was " the search for non-authoritarian and non-coercive 
means of moderating demands for participation and distribution in order to 
reconcile democracy with rapid economic development."”  Thus, cooperation 
and compromise of large interest groups, especially the peak asspciations of 
the labour movement and the business connnunity were seen as vital. There 
were some institutional proposals about the bai'gaining process. Some 
journals opened a debate on tlie merits of corporatism. These proposals about 
the bargaining process advocated experimenting with a fonn of societal 
coiporatism as a possible institutional mechanism for reconciling democracy 
with rapid economic development. In this respect, the experiment of 
societal corporatism in 1978 is important even though it failed at the end.
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Wlien Ecevit retumed from his tour of Scandinavia in 1976, he had 
announced a new opposition strategy in preparation for the 1977 elections. 
He declared that the RPP would organise its supporters along the lines of 
Scandinavian social-democratic movements by building a new relationship 
with professional organisations.*' Two years later in 1978, as the leading 
party of the coalition he tried to put this idea into practise. In order to be able 
to cope with Turkey's deepening financial crisis and rising inflation, he was 
forced to launch an experiment with societal corporatism by signing a 
" Social Contract" with Turk-Is in which he asked for union cooperation in 
holding labour costs down.*" By this agi'eement, voluntary wage restraint was 
traded for semiofficial recognition of Turk-Is as the exclusive bargaining 
agent of public sector workers. Naturally, DISK organised mass 
demonstrations to protest the deal. Nevertheless, six months later it became 
clear that " it was unworkable document because of its highly unrealistic 
promise of guaranteeing the public-sector workers their 1976 level of 
earnings."*·’
Another interesting development which took place in 1970s was 
the moderation of DISK while the militancy of Turk-Is was increasing. In 
1970s, Halil Tunc gradually emerged as the leader of Turk-Is w'ho was in 
favour of adopting more aggi'essive political role. As ideological conflict 
multiplied Turk-Is's internal divisions. Tunc began to fear that the 
confederation was moving towards a major split. Therefore, the combination 
of increasing populaiity of DISK and insistent appeals from Ecevit finally 
persuaded him to cooperate openly with leftists. He tried to revive the 
militancy within Turk-Is in order to stop the loss of membership towards 
socialist unions.
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On the other hand, at the same time with Tune's adoption of 
more militant and politically more activist line, DISK was tiydng to resist a 
new wave of radicalism. After the 12 March memorandum and the closure of 
TLP, DISK decided to support the RPP, which it found to be the second 
closest political party to its ideology. However, DISK still advocated the 
principles of political trade unionism and has not given up its belief 
that " political battle should primarily be fought by labour's own 
political organisation."*''* Despite ideological differences, cooperation with the 
RPP affected it in many ways, DISK leaders began to place greater emphasis 
on centralising authority in order to discipline new affiliates and focused on 
well-planned fomis of political action and winning legislative refonns in 
increasingly important economic struggle.*'·*'
In fact, DISK'S bureaucrats were detennined to presence their 
position as respectable, law-abiding negotiators and not to disturb the state 
beyond a certain point.**^  However, some events showed that the spontaneous 
rank-and-file militancy of the working class went beyond what the DISK 
leadership was prepared to lead. The Taris strike on the eve of military coup, 
in January 1980, clearly proved this. Several socialist organisations were 
active in this agricultural processing complex near Izmir. The strike began 
when the new JP government planned to fire some workers and employ its 
own supporters. The spontaneous strike turned into an occupation and 
received wide support from other working class districts. The government 
sent the anny equipped with annoured vehicles and helicopters to break the 
occupation. Street fights spread to other districts of Izmir. However, DISK 
leadership refused to broaden the stiiiggle beyond Izmir and prevented the
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emergence of more serious events. DISK'S moderation, as it was observ^ed 
in Taris strike case, resulted in its growing popularity among workers and 
strengthened its position as the leading representative of political unionism 
despite Turk-Is's new militancy.
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Chapter Four
CONCLUSION
One aim of analysing state-labour relationship in Turkey witli 
the help of the application of the corporatist model is to show that labour 
unions were not the only responsible actors for radicalisation and instability 
of the pre-1980 era. During the last decade, unions were blamed for almost 
evei7  economic and political problem of 1970s. It is important to note that 
authoritarian solutions to the labour question after the 1980 coup were 
introduced in the name of coiTecting the extremes of past decades. " hiteraal 
public opinion and intemational financial institutions claiming that it was the 
growth of union power which had led to the distortion of the market 
conditions prepared the climate for the radical reorganisation of the sector 
after 1980 with more extensive state controls over it."'
Tliis paper tries to invalidate these claims by identifying the 
dominant model that emerged in the relationship between the state and labour 
unions in 1946-1980 era as mamly a variant of state corporatism. It indicates 
that the labour unions were not the only source of every economic and 
political ill, but rather they were subject to continuous state attempts to install 
coiporatist structures. Therefore, before putting all the blame on labour 
unions, responsibility should be sought in state policies that shaped them. It 
should be recognised that state's initiatives " to incorporate labour into the
political system through corporatist stmctures contributed to the failure of 
Turkish democracy in tenns of its ' ungovernability ' as became apparent in 
late 1970s."" In this sense, it becomes clear that even though unions ai'e not 
perfect, they are certainly not the source of all evil, they are products of the 
society in which they are situated.
However, there is notliing unique about the Turkish case. In 
general, corporatist experiments end up with crisis regardless of which type 
of coiporatism is employed, whether inclusionary or exclusionary, 
inducements-oriented or constraints-oriented, societal or state variant.^ It is 
one of the most striking and strange characteristics of corporatism that it 
divides and radicalises the sector it wants to unite and depoliticise.“^ In fact, 
instability is inherent in the very nature of the corporatism itself-" Smce 
corporatism is biased against labour class and works asymmetrically as 
Panitch pointed out,<^  it results in breakdowns. In this view, social contracts 
are actually uneven exchanges between groups having unequal levels of 
power and resources. As groups emerge and rise up against the 
asymmetrical applications of corporatism, fragmentation intensifies and the 
system becomes more unstable and fragile. Actually, it is what happened in 
Turkey. Although Turk-Is was eager for gaining official recognition, 
monopoly of representation and some welfare benefits in return for accepting 
imposition of asymmetrical constraints, splinter groups emerged from within 
it in the late 1960s and 1970s which opposed Turk-ls's " bread-and-butter " 
job unionism and apolitical stand. However, this fragmentation brought 
" more conflict, disorder and instability for the Turkish democracy. Thus, the 
1970s were characterised by increasing politicisation, polarisation and
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radicalisation in the labour sector which provided justification for the 1980 
militaiy coup.
Throughout its history, Turk-Is welcomed introduction of 
coiporatist measures as an opportunity to build itself as the sole authorised 
body to represent workers’ interests. On the other hand, governments were 
enthusiastic about the fomiation of a powerful labour confederation Vv'hich 
would facilitate the establishment of centralised control over labour unions. 
They thought that such a confederation would be a suitable tool in 
manipulating, co-opting and reducing the working class struggle to a mere 
economism.« In short, the bargain between Turk-Is and state involved 
exclusive right of representation and the guaranteed access to policy 
making that Turk-Is leaders could not achieve independently, in return for 
moderation in exercising labour's right to strike and engage in collective 
bargaining.^ Semiofficial status and clientalism were exchanged for 
cooperation in reducing working-class demands and promoting social peace. 
However, it was these artificial attempts to create representational monopoly 
which were responsible for dissent within Turk-ls and for increasing 
fragmentation and radicalisation.
The combination of control and privilege that characterised the 
relationship between labour unions and state in 1946-1980 era is a clear 
example of Schmitter's definition of corporatism: the exchange of legal 
monopoly of representation and guaranteed access to decision-making 
process in return for some limitations on behaviour and interest articulation. 
However, Schmitter's differentiation between state, and liberal variants of 
corporatism''’ does not seem utilisable for the Turkish case. He explains the
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transition from one variant of coiporatisra to tlie other with reference to 
underlying economic change. He describes authoritarian state coiporatisin as 
being coercively imposed " from above " in contexts of delayed dependent 
development, while liberal corporatism evolves " from below " in contexts of 
advanced welfare state capitalism. However, Turkish experiment with 
societal corporatism does not confomi to his criteria, because liberal 
corporatism did not emerge spontaneously from below, but it was imposed 
from above in the absence of advanced capitalist development. In 1960s and 
1970s Turkish capitalism was still trying to cope witli the problems of 
delayed, dependent development. Attempts to implement societal 
corporatism in Turkey resulted primarily from the efforts of governments to 
create series of cartels in the major economic sectors and to draw them into 
centralised bargaining process that would facilitate planned economic 
development."
Turkish case appears confonning to Lehmbruch's definition of 
fully " corporatised " p o lity .F irs t ,  labour unions were coopted into 
decision-making process. Tliey were included in advisory committees. As it 
can be recalled from previous chapter, Turk-Is represented the labour in 
Minimum Wage Commission, the Supreme Arbitration Board, and in ad-hoc 
committees for the establishment of new constitutions and labour 
legislation.'·^
Second, labour unions were hierarchically structured and 
membership tended to be compulsory. Although under the effect of pluralist 
orientation of 1960s, Labour Code of 1963 pemiitted multiple unions based 
on voluntary membership in the same work branch, a corporative legal
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amendment was introduced in 1970 which aimed at gi'anting Turk-Is a 
representational monopoly at the national level.A ccord ing  to this cnicial 
amendment, a trade union could organise nationally only if it represented at 
least one-third of the workers in that particular branch of industi^.
Third, industrial relations were characterised by " concertation " 
of labour unions ajid employers' organisations with government in 1960-1980 
era. It implied that unions refrained from strongly employing the strike 
w'eapon or highly conflictual tactics. Fundementally, the hea\7  government 
and business influence on Turk-Is played a restraining role on workers' 
struggles. One particularly clear example occured in Kozlu where coal miners 
had to battle with security forces ( with two miners shot ) and then Halil 
Tunc, Secretary General of Turk-ls denounced the strike as illegal and 
strikers as communist provocateurs.’-" Another example is the strike at the 
Pasabahce glass factory in 1966 which led to the establishment of DISK in 
1967.
Finally, although for a long time Turkish case lacked 
Lehrnbruch's last criteria, that is strong linkages between political parties and 
labour unions, apolitical trend came to an end with emergence of social- 
democratic faction within Turk-Is which advocated for supporting the RPP, 
and other confederations each of which siding with different parties - DISK 
first supporting TLP then the RPP, HAK-IS supporting pro-lslamic NSP, and 
MISK supporting the neo-fascist NAP.
Wlien O'Donnell's views emphasising economic imperatives in 
the emergence of different varieties of state coiporatism are applied to 
Turkish case, Turkey under the DP rule can be put into the categoi'y of 
" incorporating populist-authoritarian "systems associated with the early
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phase of import substitution policy.’^  During the DP period, Turkey was still 
in the early phase of " easy " import substitution which enabled the DP to 
implement welfare programs. According to O'Donnell, Import Substitution 
Industrialisation (ISI) policies of populist governments necessitates the 
expansion of the domestic market and real increases in the purchasing power 
of workers. Hence, under incoiporating regimes workers receive important 
benefits and support for unionisation. When Turkish case is examined under 
the light of views expressed by O'Donnell, it can be claimed that by 
implementing welfare policies, the DP was in fact trying to lay down the 
foundations of extended intenial mai'ket which was a part of the import 
substitution strategy of the period.
However, populism of the DP was also corporatist: it pennitted 
the political activation and social incorporation of labour while carefully 
controlling their demands by the imposition of vertical relationship 
subordinating the unions to the state. Wliile the government often provided 
more benefits than the union representatives had demanded, it consistently 
rejected their requests for a greater role in decision making and program 
administration. The policy of the DP was not an exclusionary fonn of state 
coiporatism aimed at repressing and excluding worker class demands. 
However, while incoiporating the ordinary members of labour tlirough 
inducements such as welfare legislation, the DP always excluded Turk-Is 
from decision taking process. As a mechanism of control, the DP encouraged 
an apolitical trend among workers by having the unions organised by 
American experts. On the other hand, however, " the top cadres of Turk-Is 
were exclusively recruited from among strong DP partisans. The DP 
employed a double faced policy of banning political activity and then co­
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opting union leaders into their own party."’'' Throughout the 1970s, coalition 
governments led by the JP revived this old DP practise of selective 
incorporation. " They strictly enforced the law against troublesome labour 
groups while tolerating or encouraging its violation by supporters of its riglit- 
wing coalition partners."”’
In tenus of the political-organisational variables employed by 
Stepan to distiguish favourable and unfavourable conditions for the 
implementation of state corporatist policies,’^  inclusionary authoritarian 
policies did not face much obstacles in Turkey during the DP period. In this 
era, there was a low degree of associational autonomy which could have 
facilitated the adoption of inclusionary state corporatism. Second, under the 
DP mle, there was not an ideological polarisation. On the contrary, both of 
the two parties were committed to the prevailing Cold War ideology.T his 
situation made the implementation of incorporating policies easier. Finally, 
there was a low degree of prior social welfai’e legislation as favourable to 
inclusionay strategies, because it left the DP substantial" refomi space " for 
incorporating labour by initiating redistributive measures and conditioning 
the receipt of benefits on the acceptance of state control over unions. The DP 
was generous in distributing material benefits to the working class, but it 
made them conditional on their restraint from getting involved in politics.
By using the Colliers' identification of four different varieties of 
state corporatism along a continuum of " constraints-oriented " and 
" inducements-oriented " arrangements,^' it is possible to characterise the 
policy of the DP towards labour unions a s " preemptive co-optation " type. In 
this kind of the system which is situated on the constraints-oriented side of
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the continuum, state is able to retain effective control over the nascent labour 
movements without widespread and sustained coercion by gradually 
increasing both constraints and inducements. Through encouragement of the 
cooperation of weak union leaders, governments try to avoid a future labour 
problem. On the other hand, the period after the military coup of 1960 seems 
more on the inducements-oriented side of state corporatism. However, 
especially when great reliance on inducements over labour unions during 
1960-1971 era is taken into consideration, it is also possible to charactense 
the model of the period as an " emerging fonn of societal corporatism " or an 
" intennediate case between state and societal corporatism ". During tliis 
period, governments' policies towards labour unions were heavily 
inducements-oriented in order to provide their collaboration for realising 
ambitious political and economic aims. " After the 1971 coup-by­
memorandum, however, the motifs of state corporatism gained the 
prominence.
Considering the developments that took place in Turkey during 
1970s, Panitch's view's seem right regarding the inherent instability of 
corporatist structures due to their asymmetrical functioning.-·^ Since the 
corporatist structures had a bias against working class, Turk-Is leaders 
became unable to promote the interests of their members, thus they were 
delegitimised in the eyes of their rank-and-file. This dissent brought 
fi-agmentation and instability which in turn led to new state coercive 
measures as Panitch estimated. 1980 military coup proved the rightness of 
Panitch's warning that increasing instability and resulting coercive efforts to 
preserve coiporatism will bring more authoritarian tendencies and 
breakdowns in the future.
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W^ien Lehmbruch's identification of three major varieties of 
liberal coiporatisni is taken into consideration, Turkish experiment with 
societal corporatism in 1970s resemble unstable systems of" economic crisis 
management " in which concerted action is dependent on active state 
interv'ention and tend to break down during periods of economic recovery 
and prosperity.-^ In this state-coordinated type of liberal corporatism, 
effective collaboration only occurs under the pressure of threatening 
unemployment and it sewes as an instrument of crisis management rather 
than of continuous economic guidance. In confonnity with this view, Ecevit 
government as the leading party of the coalition was forced to experiment 
with societal coiporatism in 1978 as result of Turkey’s deepening financial 
crisis and rising i n f l a t i on . As  Lehmbruch has foreseen, union leaders' 
willingness to participate in liberal coiporatist aiTangement was relatively 
high because social democrats were the leading party in government. 
However, contrary to Lehmbruch's expectations, this unconventional 
response to crisis was not gTadually accepted as a routine technique of 
conflict resolution, and coiporatist bargaining did not " spill o v e r " to cover 
previously excluded issues.
Prior to 1980 military coup, conditions seemed favouring more 
the emergence of " exclusionaiy bureaucratic-authoritarian " ppe of 
corporatism.-6 There were trade imbalances, chronic shortages of foreign 
exchange and high levels of foreign indebtness, all leading to increasing 
external economic dependence. In addition, although Turkey was successful 
in the " easy " phase of ISI by achieving the production of basic consumer 
goods for the domestic market and light industries such as glass and textile, 
further development necessitated the " deepening " of industrialisation
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through the domestic manufacture of intemiediate and capital goods. 
However, this could not be realised without the collaboration of international 
capital which in turn required a high degree o f " future certainty " of social 
peace and political stability. As a result, a defensive reaction occured and a 
" bureuacratic-authoritarian " state which is based on exclusion of pre\'iously 
activated popular sector emerged. Although this new t>q)e of state was 
obviously exclusionaiy, it was not corporatist. The policy of the government 
was not to coiporatise unions, but rather " de-politicise, de-mobilise, de- 
radicalise and de-uiiionise labour class. According to Sakallioglu, " the 
post-1980 aiTangements were not neo-corporatist and also they could hardly 
be called pluralist.
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